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Abstract  
We investigated the importance of the social context for people’s voluntary 
contributions to a national park in Costa Rica, using a natural field experiment. Some 
subjects make actual contributions while others state their hypothetical contribution. 
Both the degree of anonymity and information provided about the contributions of 
others influence subject contributions in the hypothesized direction. We found a 
substantial hypothetical bias with regard to the amount contributed. However, the 
influence of the social contexts is about the same when the subjects make actual 
monetary contributions as when they state their hypothetical contributions. Our results 
have important implications for validity testing of stated preference methods: a 
comparison between hypothetical and actual behavior should be done for a given social 
context. 
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1 Introduction 
Context often matters even when conventional economic theory predicts that it should 
not (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In this paper we aim to quantify the effect of two 
types of contexts on people’s voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica: 
the degree of anonymity and information about the contributions of others. We use a 
natural field experiment to investigate whether the influence of social context is 
different for hypothetical contributions than for actual contributions. 
In the literature, there is ample evidence of context effects on environmental 
valuation, for example that framing in terms of scenario description, payment vehicle, 
or the degree of anonymity influences survey responses (Blamey et al., 1999; Russel et 
al., 2003; List et al., 2004). Schkade and Payne (1994) used a verbal protocol 
methodology where they let people think aloud when answering a contingent valuation 
question, and concluded that people seem to base their responses on issues other than 
what the environmental valuation literature typically assumes. For example, the authors 
found that before the respondent provided an answer, more than 40% of the respondents 
considered how much others would be willing to contribute.  
However, much of the experimental evidence suggests that context matters also 
in situations involving actual payments or contributions (Hoffman et al., 1994; 
Cookson, 2000; McCabe et al., 2000). More specifically, there is ample support that so-
called conditional cooperation, meaning that many people would indeed like to 
contribute to an overall good cause, such as a public good, but only if other people 
contribute their fair share (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Gächter, 
2006; Shang and Croson, 2006). In the light of this, the finding by Schkade and Payne 
(1994) may not be that surprising. One interesting question is whether respondent 
 3
behavior is more sensitive to context (such as the perception of the behaviors of others) 
when making a hypothetical - but realistic - choice, compared to when making a choice 
that involves an actual payment. Some have suggested that this difference may be large 
(e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), whereas others such as Hanemann (1994) 
believe that the difference is small (if it exist at all) and that context affects behavior 
generally and not just in survey-based valuation studies.1 The empirical evidence for 
comparing the effects of context is rather scarce. Moreover, one may question the result 
of comparing lab experiments with hypothetical and actual money, if the purpose is to 
measure how closely they resemble real life behavior; see Levitt and List (2007) for a 
discussion.  
This paper presents results of a natural field experiment – to use the terminology 
of Harrison and List (2004) – in Costa Rica, where we investigate the importance of (1) 
anonymity with respect to the solicitor and (2) information about the contributions of 
others.2 In particular, we quantified and compared these effects for two samples: one 
based on hypothetical contributions and one on actual contributions.  
The effect of anonymity has been investigated previously for both hypothetical 
and actual treatments (Legget et al., 2003; List et al., 2004; Soetevent, 2005). For 
example, Legget et al. (2003) found that stated willingness to pay was approximately 23 
percent higher when the contingent valuation survey was administered through face-to-
face interviews rather than being self-administered by the respondents. List et al. (2004) 
looked at charitable contributions – both hypothetical and actual – to the Center for 
Environmental Policy Analysis at the University of Central Florida, using three different 
information treatments: (i) the responses were completely anonymous, (ii) the 
experimenter knew the response, and (iii) the whole group knew the response. While 
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they found the largest share of “yes” responses when the whole group was informed of 
the response (followed by when only the experimenter knew the response), they also 
found that the differences among the information treatments were similar in the 
hypothetical and the actual voting treatments. A contribution of this present paper is to 
test whether this finding can be generalized to a field experiment setting.  
The effect of information about the contributions or behaviors of others has been 
investigated in several field experiments (Alpizar et al., 2007; Frey and Meier, 2004; 
Shang and Croson, 2006; Heldt, 2005; Martin and Randall, 2005). For example, Shang 
and Croson (2006) investigated how information about a typical contribution to a radio 
station affects subject contributions. They found that their highest reference amount 
($300) implied a significantly higher contribution than giving no information at all. The 
direction for smaller amounts ($75 and $180) was the same, although not statistically 
significant. As far as we know, no previous study has looked directly at how 
information about the contributions of others affect stated contributions.3 Consequently, 
the present paper is also the first to analyze the difference between a hypothetical and 
actual treatment with respect to the influence of provided information about the 
contributions of others.  
We find that, both the degree of anonymity and information provided about the 
contributions of others influence contributions in the hypothesized direction. We also 
find a substantial hypothetical bias with regard to the amount contributed, which is 
consistent with earlier results. The most important finding is that the influence of the 
social contexts is similar when the subjects make actual monetary contributions as when 
they state their hypothetical contributions. Thus, we do not find that people are 
significantly more vulnerable to framing effects in the hypothetical treatment. Our 
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results have important implications for valuation methods, including validity testing of 
stated preference methods. For example, our results suggest that a comparison between 
hypothetical and actual behavior should be done for a given social context. The body of 
this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our field-experimental design, 
Section 3 the corresponding results, while Section 4 concludes the paper.    
 
2 Design of the experiment 
The experiment/survey look at contributions by visiting international tourists to the Poas 
National Park (PNP) in Costa Rica in 2006. We put great effort into ensuring that the 
situation was realistic and credible; there was nothing indicating that this was a 
university study to analyze people’s behavior. This is potentially very important since, 
as noted by Levitt and List (2007), a perceived experimental situation may highlight 
people’s sense of identity or self-image to a larger extent than outside the experimental 
situation; cf. Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  
 Our five solicitors were officially registered interviewers of the Costa Rican 
Tourism Board. We began by inviting all potential interviewers by email to a first 
screening meeting where we evaluated their personalities and abilities to speak fluently 
in both Spanish and English. Of ten possible solicitors interviewed, we chose five who 
fulfilled all our requirements. The five solicitors participated randomly in all parts of the 
experiment. Nevertheless, we control for solicitor effects in the regression analysis. The 
solicitors underwent extensive, paid training sessions both in the classroom and in the 
field. Once they were ready to start, we dedicated a whole week to testing their 
performance and to making small adjustments in the survey instrument. In addition, 
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there were daily debriefing questions and regular meetings with the whole team to make 
sure that all solicitors were using the same exact wording of the scenarios.  
 The solicitors approached international tourists after they had visited the volcano 
crater, which is the main attraction of the park. The tourists were approached at a 
“station” outside the restaurant and souvenir shop, which was decorated with the logos 
of the PNP, the National System of Protected Areas (SINAC), and Tropical Agricultural 
Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE). The solicitors wore uniforms with the 
logos of the PNP and CATIE, and carried formal identification cards that included a 
photo and signatures of park authorities. The uniforms were very similar to those used 
by the PNP park rangers. A formal letter authorizing the collection of contributions/the 
survey was also clearly visible.  
 Only international tourists who could speak either Spanish or English 
participated in the experiment. The subjects were approached randomly, and only one 
person in the same group of visitors was approached. The selection was a key element 
of the training sessions, and we checked daily for subject selection biases. No 
corrections were required after the pilot sessions. 
Subjects were first asked if they were willing to participate in an interview about 
their visit to the PNP. No mention of voluntary contributions took place at this stage, so 
we expect that participation was not affected by monetary considerations. Overall 
participation rates were high (above 85% each day). Once it was established that the 
subjects were international tourists and that they had already visited the crater, the 
solicitors proceeded with the interview. Before the experiment, subjects were asked a 
few questions regarding their visit to Costa Rica and to the national park. The solicitors 
were provided with standardized replies to the most common questions regarding the 
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survey, the experiment, the institutions involved, etc. For further information the 
participants were advised to talk to the main supervisor of the contribution campaign. 
In total 991 subjects participated in the experiments. We conducted experiments 
both with hypothetical and with actual contributions. For each type of experiment, we 
used anonymous and non-anonymous treatments as well as three different reference 
levels for the stated contributions of others. Table 1 summarizes the experimental 
design for all treatments. To avoid cross-contamination we decided to conduct the 
hypothetical and actual treatments during the same period, but never simultaneously. 
This means that all solicitors worked on hypothetical contributions during one part of 
the day and actual contributions during the other part of the day. This ordering was 
randomly decided. All the other different treatments were conducted simultaneously, 
and they were randomly distributed both in terms of time of day and among solicitors.  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
The different treatments required slight modifications of the interviewing script, as 
outlined below, but we were very careful to limit the differences between the 
treatments. Subjects also received a card where they could read the scenario and the 
instructions for the voluntary contribution. The experiment began with the following 
sentence for all treatments: 
“I will now read to you some information about the funding of national parks 
in Costa Rica. Here is a paper with the information I will read.”  
After this, the participants were told about the main purpose of the request for a 
contribution. The wording that is unique for the hypothetical treatment is in parentheses, 
whereas the corresponding wording for the actual treatment is in brackets.  
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“The system of national parks in Costa Rica is now suffering from the lack of 
funds to achieve a good management of the parks, both for biodiversity 
conservation and tourism. Available funds are simply not enough and national 
parks are trying to obtain new funds. We are now (researching) [testing] a 
system at Poas National Park where visitors can make donations to the park. 
The entrance fee (would remain) [remains] the same seven dollars, but people 
(would have) [have] the possibility to make voluntary donations to the park in 
addition to the fee. Contributions (would) [will] be used to improve the standard 
of living of park rangers, to provide for better trails and to make sure that this 
beautiful and unique ecosystem is well taken care of.” 
The effect of a social reference point was investigated by providing the subjects with 
information about a typical previous contribution by other visitors. If a reference point 
was provided, the following sentence was read:  
“We have interviewed tourists from many different countries and one of the 
most common donations has been 2 / 5 / 10 US dollars.” 
We obtained the monetary reference values from a pilot study conducted at the same 
park before our main experiment; thus, the reference information is not based on 
deception. In the treatments with no mentioned reference amount, we simply omitted 
the above sentence.  
 Finally, the actual request for a contribution differed depending on whether the 
contribution was to be anonymous or not. In the anonymous treatments, subjects were 
asked to go into a private area that was part of our interviewing station and write down 
their contribution on a piece of paper or put their contribution (if any) in a sealed 
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envelope and then into a small ballot box. This way their contribution was completely 
anonymous to the solicitor.4 The following text was then read: 
“(If there was a possibility, how much would you donate?) [How much are you 
willing to donate to this fund?] Please go to the booth and (write down the 
amount of money you would like to donate if you had the possibility) [put the 
amount of money you would like to donate in the envelope]. Remember that 
donations will be used exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National 
Park, as described before. When you are done, (please fold it up twice) [please 
seal the envelope] and put it in this box. Do not show it to me, because your 
(stated donation) [donation] should be completely anonymous. Please put the 
(paper) [envelope] in the box even if you do not wish to donate anything.” 
We provided a locked ballot box into which the contributions were put. This box was 
actually part of the interviewing station used for the experimental session. In the non-
anonymous setting, the following text was read: 
“(If there was a possibility, how much would you donate?) [How much are you 
willing to donate to this fund?] Remember that donations will be used 
exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National Park, as described 
before. When you are done reading, please (tell me the amount of money you 
would like to donate if you had the possibility) [give the envelope and your 
contribution to me so that I can count and register your donation before sealing 
the envelope. Please return the envelope even if you do not wish to donate 
anything].” 
Thus, in this treatment the subjects were well aware that the solicitor was observing 
each contribution. In addition to the differences described above, everything else was 
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identical in all interviews and we expected the typical variations of a field experiment 
(weather, type of tourist, etc) to affect our results randomly.  
 
3 Experimental Results 
Table 2 presents the full basic results of the experiments in terms of the share with a 
positive contribution, the average conditional contribution given a positive contribution, 
and the resulting sample average contribution, for each of the cells in Table 1. 
Naturally, since there is as many as 16 treatments in total, the number of observations 
becomes quite limited (between 61 and 63).  
<<Table 2 about here>> 
Due to our randomized design, it makes sense to compare the results of different 
treatments in one dimension aggregated over different treatments in the other 
dimension. For example, we can compare the effect of anonymity versus non-
anonymity in the actual money treatment by aggregating over the different reference 
information treatments. In Table 3 we therefore provide more aggregate results, which 
facilitate straightforward interpretations and comparisons.  
<<Table 3 about here>> 
The most striking finding is the large amount of hypothetical bias. In the actual 
contribution treatment, 48 percent of the subjects chose to contribute and the average 
contribution was $2.43, while in the hypothetical contribution treatment, 87 percent of 
the subjects stated that they would contribute an average of $7.58.5 Thus, the average 
contribution in the hypothetical treatment was more than three times as large as in the 
actual treatment, and the difference is highly significant using a simple t-test. The large 
hypothetical bias came as no surprise. First, there is much evidence that suggests the 
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existence of a hypothetical bias (List and Gallet, 2001) unless certain measures are 
taken, e.g. the use of so-called cheap-talk scripts (e.g. Cummings and Taylor, 1999). We 
did not take any such measures. Second, there is also evidence that the hypothetical bias 
is particularly large for public goods, compared to private goods (List and Gallett, 2001; 
Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter, 2007).  
 The signs of the effects of different social contexts are largely as expected. For 
example, if people choose to donate, they will donate substantially more if they are 
given a $10 reference point instead of a $2 reference point. This holds for both the 
hypothetical and the actual treatments.6 The effect of anonymity is less clear. In the case 
of actual contributions, the conditional contribution is larger in the non-anonymous 
case, as one might expect, whereas the opposite pattern holds in the hypothetical case. 
This is perhaps a bit surprising, since one would expect that individuals would feel more 
social pressure to contribute in the non-anonymous setting. There are two possible 
explanations. First, it is easier to exaggerate when making anonymous statements. You 
can state a high number for your own sake and pleasure without having to face the 
potential incredulity of the interviewer should this number be made public. In our data 
this shows as a somewhat larger fraction of extreme (very high) contributions in the 
anonymous-hypothetical treatment, and correspondingly a higher standard deviation, 
compared to the non-anonymous-hypothetical scenario. Moreover, this effect is not 
significant in the robust regression, once outliers are accounted for. Second, some 
subjects may have suspected that the hypothetical question was going to be followed by 
an actual request from the solicitor for contribution if they stated a positive amount. In 
the anonymous setting, on the other hand, they simply walked away and put the answer 
in the box. This effect could perhaps in particular explain the smaller fraction of 
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positive contribution in the non-anonymous hypothetical setting, although this 
difference is small. 
 However, the main purpose here is neither to investigate the extent of 
hypothetical bias nor to quantify the importance of various kinds of social contexts, but 
instead to investigate the response differences between the hypothetical and actual 
treatments with respect to these social contexts. Table 4 summarizes these differences. 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
The first part in table 4 reports the comparison between non-anonymous and anonymous 
treatments. For example, for hypothetical contributions, the share of people contributing 
is 3 percentage points lower in the non-anonymous treatment, and the sample average 
contribution is $0.67, or 8 percent, lower. By comparing the second and third columns, 
we can compare the response difference between hypothetical and actual contributions 
for a given social context treatment. Although there are indeed differences between the 
hypothetical and actual treatments, they are rather small (particularly compared to the 
hypothetical bias). More importantly, although we exclude some extreme outliers, the 
mean values are still rather sensitive to a few observations.  
 In order to deal with the outlier problem, we also present the results from a 
regression analysis. The dependent variable, contribution, is censored since it equals 
zero for a substantial fraction of the subjects. In addition, there are two issues of interest 
here: whether to contribute anything at all and how much to contribute, given a positive 
contribution. Since there are good reasons to consider these as two different decisions, a 
basic Tobit model would be inappropriate. We therefore used a simple two-stage model. 
The decision whether to contribute anything or not is modeled with a standard Probit 
model. The decision concerning how much to contribute, given a positive contribution, 
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is modeled with a regression model that used only subjects with a positive contribution. 
We tested for correlation between the two stages based on a standard sample selection 
formulation, but the parameter that reflects correlation was never significant at 
conventional levels; therefore, we only report the independent model where there is no 
correlation between the two stages. For completeness, we present both a standard OLS 
regression and a robust regression, where the latter puts a lower weight on outliers.7 The 
base case in the regression models is given by actual contributions in the anonymous 
treatment with no mention of a reference contribution. In table 5, marginal effects for 
the two estimated models are presented together with the total marginal effect, i.e. 
including the effects of the Probit stage. All marginal effects are calculated at sample 
means.8 The total marginal effect is calculated as: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]00|0|0 >∂
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where  is the expected contribution of individual i, [ iCE ] [ ]0>iCP  is the probability 
that individual i contributes anything at all, and  is a covariate. Both the probit model 
and the regression models include a constant. 
ix
 We present four different models for the contribution decision: two where the 
dependent variable is the contribution (one with a standard OLS regression and one with 
a robust regression), and two where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
the contribution (one with a standard OLS regression and one with a robust regression). 
In all models we pool the hypothetical and actual contribution data.  
 In order to correct for an overall hypothetical bias we include a dummy variable 
for the hypothetical experiment. To be able to identify response differences between the 
hypothetical and actual contribution treatments with respect to the different social 
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contexts (the main task of this paper), we create interaction variables between the 
dummy variable for hypothetical treatment and the dummy variables for each social 
context. The results are presented in table 5, where the total marginal effects are 
computed from the probit and regression models using the expression in (1); since we 
assume independence between the probit and regression model, the standard error of the 
total marginal effect is simply a weighted sum of the standard errors of the marginal 
effects in the two models. P-values are reported for a two-sided t-test. 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
The coefficient associated with the hypothetical experiment is, as expected, large and 
highly significant in all models, reflecting a large hypothetical bias. The following four 
coefficients in Table 5 show the influence of the different social contexts for the actual 
contribution experiment. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments.9 These results can be 
compared to List et al. (2004) who found that the proportion of subjects voting in favor 
of a proposal to finance a public good was significantly lower in a treatment where 
subjects were completely anonymous (20 percent) compared with a treatment where the 
solicitor observes the behavior (38 percent). The likelihood of a positive contribution is 
also higher in the treatment with a $2 reference contribution compared with giving no 
reference information at all, whereas the corresponding effect on conditional 
contributions is negative. It thus appears that while providing a low reference point 
increases the probability of a positive contribution, the average size of the contribution 
is lower when compared to not providing a reference point.  
Our main interest lies in the last four coefficients. They reflect the difference in 
social context effects between the hypothetical and actual experiments, where we have 
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controlled for an overall difference between the two experiments. For non-anonymity 
we do not find any significant difference between the hypothetical and actual 
experiments for any of the presented models. For reference contributions, we do not 
find any significant difference between the hypothetical and actual experiments for the 
$2 and $5 reference contributions; this applies both for the probability of a positive 
contribution and for the size of the conditional contribution. For the $10 reference 
contribution, we do not find any significant difference in most models. However, in the 
case of a robust regression where the dependent variable is the contribution, we do find 
a significant difference (at the 10 percent level). For the $10 reference level, the 
increase in contributions is $1.40 higher in the hypothetical experiments, compared to 
the actual experiments. This finding is far from robust, and in the standard OLS 
regression the sign is reversed (although the effect is insignificant).10 In the two models 
with the log of contribution as the dependent variable, both the OLS and the robust 
regression show that the influence of the $10 reference level on the conditional 
contribution is about 20 percent higher in the hypothetical compared to the actual 
treatment, but the coefficient is insignificant in both cases.  
In the regression models we corrected for individual characteristics in terms of 
gender, and age of the subjects, whether they are members of an environmental 
organization, whether they saw the volcano (the main attraction of the park), a dummy 
variable for US subjects, and a dummy variable for European subjects. The 
corresponding parameters (not reported) revealed small and statistically insignificant 
effects on behaviour. We also corrected for solicitor effects by including solicitor 
dummy variables. Moreover, previous studies have shown that the solicitor effects may 
differ systematically with respect to the respondent characteristics. For example, Landry 
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et al. (2006) investigated the effect of physical attractiveness of female solicitors and 
found a much larger contribution effect for Caucasian males than for other groups. 
Therefore we also interacted the solicitor dummy variables with the gender and age of 
the respondent. Some of the solicitor coefficients were significant, and some of the 
interactions between solicitors and age of the respondent had significant effects. 
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper discusses a test for whether people are more influenced by social contexts in 
a hypothetical experiment than in an experiment with actual monetary implications. We 
base the test on a natural field experiment with voluntary contributions to a national 
park in Costa Rica. Although we find a large hypothetical bias, we did not find any 
significant differences between hypothetical and actual contributions with respect to the 
effects of social context, except for one treatment and one regression model for which a 
significant effect at the 10 percent level was observed. The results suggest that social 
context is important in general, and is not a phenomenon that is primarily present in 
situations that do not involve tradeoffs with actual money. This can be compared to List 
et al. (2004), who observed similar effects of different information treatments for 
hypothetical and actual voting treatments. Our results consequently provide empirical 
support to the findings by List et al. in the context of field experiments.    
Our results also have important implications for validity tests of stated 
preference methods, such as the contingent valuation method. A frequently used test, 
which is often considered reliable, is to compare the hypothetical responses from a 
stated preference method with a corresponding set-up that involves actual money (e.g. 
Cummings et al. (1997) and Blumenschein et al. (2007). However, it follows from the 
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results here that treatments that involve actual monetary payments are in general also 
vulnerable to framing effects. This questions then the general validity of such tests; this 
conclusion parallels List et al. (2004). If the ultimate purpose of the validity test is to 
find out to what extent the results from stated and the revealed preference methods 
differ - what Carson et al. (1996) denote a convergence validity test - it is important that 
the social context is as similar as possible in the two settings.  
The ultimate purpose of valuation methods, including stated preference methods, 
is some kind of welfare analysis of a non-market (e.g. environmental) good, with the 
aim of providing useful information related to a public policy issue. The results here 
indicate that one should be careful when making such analysis, both for the reason of 
hypothetical bias and due to the framing effects. Moreover, since the results from the 
actual contribution experiment were equally vulnerable to the framing and to the context 
in which the preferences were elicited, one must be cautious when making welfare 
analysis also based on revealed behavior. Consequently, it is in general not straight 
forward based on either a stated preference or a revealed preference method to 
generalize the findings obtained in one context/domain to another. Finally, one has also 
to consider whether the framing effects reflect what Kahneman et al. (1997) denote 
experienced utility, i.e. the kind of well-being that we presumably would like the 
welfare analysis to reflect, or whether they just reflect decision utility so that choices are 
affected but that well-being is not; see also Kahneman and Thaler (2006).  
However, as noted by a referee, the framing effects do not only cause problems; 
sometimes they may be seen as an asset for the researcher. Assume that the framing 
effects provide some element of information that respondents use to update beliefs over 
uncertain or ambiguous outcomes. The researcher could then use a variation of contexts 
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in order to identify belief structures, and about how variations in the degree of 
uncertainty or ambiguity affect the stated value. If our finding that actual contribution 
experiments are equally sensitive to framing holds more generally, we could in principle 
generalize the insights from the framing effects in a stated preference experiment to an 
actual payment setting. Future research based on other samples and different situations 
is encouraged in order to test the extent to which the findings here are robust. 
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1 Note that we do not refer to the issue of hypothetical bias, i.e. that there is a difference between stated 
and real contributions for a given context. A large number of studies do find a hypothetical bias, although 
the occurrence and extent of it depends on a number of factors such as the type of good and the elicitation 
method. For an overview see List and Gallet (2001). 
2 For other recent field experimental studies on determinants of charitable giving, see e.g. List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2002), Landry et al. (2006) and Karlan and List (2007).  
3 However, one explanation of so-called yea-saying – the tendency of some respondents to agree with an 
interviewer’s request regardless of their true views (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) – is that respondents 
believe that the suggested bid in a contingent valuation survey contains information about the behaviors 
of others. If so, one may interpret observed yea-saying bias as an indication of the influence of the 
contributions of others. Several papers have investigated the presence of yea-saying; see for example 
(Blamey et al., 1999; Holmes and Kramer, 1995). 
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4 In order for us to identify the contributions and link them to the other questions in the questionnaire, an 
ID number was written on the envelope. The subjects were informed about the ID number and the reason 
for using it. The important feature is that the solicitor was not able to observe the contribution, not even 
afterwards.  
5 As always in stated preference surveys with an open-ended question, a number of respondents state very 
high numbers. These responses have a strong influence on the average contribution. We have therefore 
dropped observations stating contributions larger than $100. The lowest contribution we deleted was 
$450. In the actual contribution experiment, the highest contribution was $50. 
6 As noted by a referee, people’s willingness to contribute may depend on the baseline quality of the park 
without the contribution. This quality, in turn, will then be affected by whether others contribute a lot or 
not. This is therefore another potential reason why the reference information may matter. However, the 
direction of such an effect is not clear, and one could equally well argue that people would be willing to 
pay more if the park has a large financial need, which would be amplified if others were willing to 
contribute very little. Overall we therefore doubt that this motivation can explain why people want to 
contribute more when they are informed about the high reference contribution by others. The good here 
also have similarities to the one considered by Champ et al. (1997), the removal of roads near Grand 
Canyon, in that it is scalable with the contribution. 
7 We use the rreg command in STATA. First a standard regression is estimated, and observations with a 
Cook’s distance larger than one are excluded. Then the model is estimated iteratively: it performs a 
regression, calculates weights based on absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights 
(STATA, 2005). See Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) for a description of the robust regression model.  
8 For the probit model, the marginal effect for dummy variables is for a discrete change of the variable 
from zero to one.  
9 We also estimated models where the difference between anonymous and non-anonymous treatment was 
allowed to vary among the different reference contribution treatments. The results were the same in these 
models, with the exception of one interaction term in the OLS regression model. 
10 The underlying reason for this rather large difference between the robust regression and the OLS results 
is of course the influence of a few large contributions. 
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Table 1. Experimental design for all treatment combinations. 
 
 Hypothetical contributions Actual contributions Total 
 Anonymous Non-anonymous Anonymous Non-anonymous  
No reference contribution 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 63 observations 250 
Reference contribution: $2 63 observations 62 observations 61 observations 63 observations 249 
Reference contribution: $5 60 observations 61 observations 62 observations 62 observations 249 
Reference contribution: $10 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 249 
Total  247 observations 247 observations 247 observations 250 observations 991 
 
Table 2. Summary results for all treatments 
 
Anonymous Non-anonymous  
Share pos. 
contribution 
Conditional 
average 
contribution 
(std) 
Sample 
average 
contribution 
(std) 
Share pos. 
contribution 
Conditional 
average 
contribution 
(std) 
Sample 
average 
contribution 
(std) 
 Hypothetical contributions
No Reference 0.86 11.27 9.64 0.81 12.27 9.86 
Reference: $2 0.89 6.54 5.82 0.87 5.44 4.7 
Reference: $5 0.85 6.68 5.67 0.91 7.44 6.71 
Reference: $10 0.94 11.22 10.5 0.84 9.11 7.64 
 Actual contributions
No Reference 0.43 7.72 3.37 0.46 5.31 2.45 
Reference: $2 0.57 2.57 1.48 0.54 4.36 2.36 
Reference: $5 0.47 5.57 2.6 0.4 3.96 1.59 
Reference: $10 0.42 4.78 2 0.52 6.85 3.53 
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Table 3. Summary results of contributions for different treatments. 
 
Treatment 
 
Nobs. Share pos. 
contribution 
Conditional average 
contribution (std) 
Sample average 
contribution (std) 
 Hypothetical contributions
Total 494 0.87 8.73  
(10.56) 
7.58  
(10.27) 
Anonymous 247 0.88 8.97  
(11.69) 
7.92  
(11.35) 
Non-anonymous 247 0.85 8.49  
(9.26) 
7.25  
(9.07) 
No Reference 124 0.83 11.76  
(15.81) 
9.77 
 (15.07) 
Reference: $2 125 0.88 6.00  
(6.94) 
5.28  
(6.80) 
Reference: $5 121 0.88 7.08  
(5.82) 
6.20 
 (5.92) 
Reference: $10 124 0.89 10.22  
(10.08) 
9.07 
(10.03) 
 Actual contributions
Total 497 0.48 5.09  
(5.74) 
2.43  
(4.70) 
Anonymous 247 0.47 5.00  
(5.65) 
2.37  
(4.62) 
Non-anonymous 250 0.48 5.17  
(5.84) 
2.48 
 (4.80) 
No Reference 125 0.45 6.48  
(7.45) 
2.90  
(3.58) 
Reference: $2 124 0.56 3.46  
(3.81) 
1.92 
 (3.32) 
Reference: $5 124 0.44 4.82  
(3.24) 
2.10  
(3.21) 
Reference: $10 124 0.47 5.92  
(7.05) 
2.78  
(5.20) 
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 Table 4. Contribution differences between different treatments divided along 
hypothetical and actual contribution treatments. 
 
 
 Contribution differences between samples  
 Hypothetical contributions Actual contributions 
 Non-anonymous - anonymous
Share positive 
contribution 
- 3 percentage points 1 percentage point 
Conditional contribution -$0.48 
(-5%) 
$0.17 
(3%) 
Sample contribution -$0.67 
(-8%) 
$0.11 
(5%) 
 Reference $2 - No reference
Share positive 
contribution 
5 percentage points 8 percentage points 
Conditional contribution -$5.76 
(-49%) 
-$3.02 
(-47%) 
Sample contribution -$4.49 
(-46%) 
-$0.98 
(-34%) 
 Reference $5 - No reference
Share positive 
contribution 
5 percentage points -1 percentage point 
Conditional contribution -$4.66 
(-40%) 
-$1.66 
(-26%) 
Sample contribution -$3.57 
(-36%) 
-$0.80 
(-28%) 
 Reference $10 - No reference
Share positive 
contribution 
6 percentage points 2 percentage points 
Conditional contribution -$1.54 
(-13%) 
-$0.56 
(-9%) 
Sample contribution -$0.7 
(-7%) 
-$0.12 
(-4%) 
Table 5. Regression analysis of hypothetical and actual contributions to the national park. The coefficients reflect marginal effects 
evaluated at sample means. All models include an intercept, solicitor dummy variables and subject characteristics variables. P-values 
in parentheses.  
 
 Dependent variable: Contribution Dependent variable: log(Contribution) 
 OLS-regression Robust regression OLS-regression Robust regression 
 
Probit 
Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect Conditional 
effect 
Total effect 
Hypothetical 
contribution (HC) 
0.388 
(0.000) 
5.808 
(0.001) 
6.775 
(0.000) 
1.979 
(0.002) 
4.210 
(0.000) 
0.628 
(0.000) 
1.042 
(0.000) 
0.432 
(0.003) 
0.910 
(0.000) 
Non-anonymous 
treatment 
0.012 
(0.764) 
0.021 
(0.986) 
0.075 
(0.945) 
-0.121 
(0.790) 
0.008 
(0.987) 
0.017 
(0.877) 
0.030 
(0.789) 
-0.065 
(0.527) 
-0.024 
(0.825) 
Treatment with a $2 
reference contribution 
0.092 
(0.068) 
-3.012 
(0.068) 
-1.337 
(0.367) 
-2.091 
(0.001) 
-0.716 
(0.281) 
-0.502 
(0.000) 
-0.256 
(0.096) 
-0.726 
(0.000) 
-0.339 
(0.021) 
Treatment with a $5 
reference contribution 
-0.015 
(0.795) 
-1.450 
(0.408) 
-1.082 
(0.494) 
-0.022 
(0.983) 
-0.126 
(0.862) 
-0.099 
(0.535) 
-0.090 
(0.588) 
-0.095 
(0.528) 
-0.087 
(0.584) 
Treatment with a $10 
reference contribution 
0.021 
(0.708) 
-0.107 
(0.951) 
0.082 
(0.958) 
0.096 
(0.883) 
0.218 
(0.756) 
-0.138 
(0.376) 
-0.060 
(0.714) 
-0.060 
(0.683) 
-0.007 
(0.963) 
HC*Non-anonymous 
treatment 
-0.056 
(0.397) 
-0.320 
(0.829) 
-0.633 
(0.647) 
0.305 
(0.589) 
-0.214 
(0.759) 
0.010 
(0.943) 
-0.158 
(0.597) 
0.112 
(0.377) 
-0.015 
(0.923) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$2 ref. contribution 
-0.003 
(0.973) 
-2.772 
(0.181) 
-1.835 
(0.338) 
-0.701 
(0.374) 
-0.447 
(0.639) 
-0.030 
(0.875) 
-0.015 
(0.945) 
0.070 
(0.694) 
0.051 
(0.806) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$5 ref. contribution 
0.077 
(0.335) 
-3.032 
(0.160) 
-1.459 
(0.458) 
-0.758 
(0.356) 
0.064 
(0.945) 
-0.180 
(0.359) 
0.003 
(0.990) 
-0.121 
(0.512) 
0.042 
(0.837) 
HC*Treatment with a 
$10 ref. contribution 
0.077 
(0.339) 
-1.385 
(0.514) 
-0.356 
(0.855) 
1.511 
(0.062) 
1.585 
(0.086) 
0.209 
(0.280) 
0.263 
(0.214) 
0.194 
(0.286) 
0.253 
(0.214) 
Solicitor dummy 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Subject characteristics 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of obs 900 666  666  666  666  
R2 / pseudo R2 0.17 0.10  0.23  0.22  0.23  
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